Sunday, April 8, 2012

UPTET Allahabad Highcourt : Petitioner Challenging Amendment in Rule (Selection Through TET Merit ) for Selection of Teacher in UP, Petition Dismissed


UPTET Allahabad Highcourt : Petitioner Challenging Amendment in Rule (Selection Through TET Merit ) for Selection of Teacher in UP, Petition Dismissed


See Case Details 

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

AFR
Court No. - 33

Case :- WRIT - A No. - 72433 of 2011

Petitioner :- Govind Kumar Dixit & Others
Respondent :- State Of U.P. & Others
Petitioner Counsel :- Smt. Supriya P. Nagar,Ashok Khare,Pratik J. Nagar, Siddharth Khare 
Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.,R.A. Akhtar,S.K. Verma

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.
1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the petitioners at length, learned Standing Counsel, Sri S.K. Verma and Sri R.A. Akhtar, Advocates for respondents.
2. Petitioners have assailed the validity of Rule 14 of U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the "1981 Rules") as inserted by notification dated 09.11.2011 and further request to treat it inoperative in case this Court finds that conditions in advertisement dated 29/30.11.2011 is based upon the said Rules. They have also assailed the validity of advertisement dated 29/30.11.2011 issued by the Board of Basic Education in U.P. (hereinafter referred to as the "Board")
3. It would be appropriate first to notice the very Rule which has been assailed in this writ petition. It reads as under:
"14. Determination of vacancies and preparation of list (1) In respect of appointment, by direct recruitment to the post of Mistress of Nursery Schools and Assistant Master or Assistant Mistress of Junior Basic Schools under clause (a) of rule 5, the appointing authority shall determine the number of vacancies as also the number of vacancies to be reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and other categories under rule 9 and notify the vacancies in at least two leading news papers having adequate circulation in the State as well as in concerned district inviting applications from candidates possessing prescribed training qualification from the district concerned and who have passed teacher eligibility test conducted by Government of Uttar Pradesh.
(2) The appointing authority shall scrutinize the applications received in pursuance of the advertisement and prepare a list of such persons as appear to possess the prescribed academic qualifications and be eligible for appointment.
(3) The names of candidates in the list prepard under sub-rule (2) shall then be arranged in such manner that their names shall be placed in descending order on the basis of the marks obtained in Teacher Eligibility Test conducted by the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
Provided that if two or more candidates obtain equal marks, the candidiate senior in age shall be placed higher. 
(4) No person shall be eligible for appointment unless his or her name is included in the list prepared under sub-rule (2).
(5) the list prepared under sub-rule (2) and arranged in accordance with sub-rule (3) shall be forwarded by the appointing authority to the selection committee."
4. It is worthy to mention at this stage that in the State of U.P. since 1972 Basic Education is being governed by U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1972") and the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder. All the primary schools in State of U.P. imparting education from Class I to VIII need to get recognition from Board in order to have a valid qualification unless such qualification is obtained from an institution, equivalent and recognised by some other similar educational body.
5. Prior to Act, 1972 there were three types of primary schools mainly functioning in State of U.P., (1) those established and managed by State Government through its various departments, (2) those established by local bodies and managed by them and, (3) those established by private bodies.
6. These were/are some institutions established by private bodies and are recognised by other Boards like Indian Council for Secondary Education, Central Board of Secondary Education etc. with which this Court is not concerned.
7. These primary schools established and managed by private managements were also having different financial arrangements inasmuch as some were wholly managed by private bodies from their own funds, some partly from the grant from Government or Governmental bodies and some which were fully under the grant from Government but for other purposes managed by private bodies.
8. With the enactment of Act, 1972 the institution managed by local bodies and Government stood transferred to the Board and since then are being managed by it. At present the number of such schools is more than 1.25 lacs in the entire State. These primary schools are in two categories, namely, Junior Primary Schools, i.e., from Class I to V and Senior Primary Schools or Junior High Schools, i.e., from Class VI to VIII. In respect to institutions managed by Board, it has framed rules laying down process of recruitment, appointment and conditions of service of its teachers. In respect to Junior Primary Schools, i.e., from Class I to V the Rules laying down process of recruitment, appointment and other conditions of service of teaching staffs are 1981 Rules. The qualifications to be possessed by persons eligible for appointment as Assistant Teacher in Junior Primary Schools is clearly laid down in Rule 8 of 1981 Rules. Besides other educational qualification, it talks of training qualification, namely, Certificate of Teaching, Hindustani Teaching Certificate, Basic Teacher Certificate etc. The most prevalent training qualification used to be imparted by Government institutions, namely, District Institute for Education and Training (hereinafter referred to as the "DIET") which are owned and managed by State Government. In every district there is/was one such institution. Since the Junior Primary Schools are situated in much interior areas, considering all the relevant facts and circumstances in this respect, the authorities used to make recruitment at district level basis so that teachers appointed are mostly those who live in same local area having first hand information of local requirement etc. and may serve the young students in a better way.
9. In order to bring standard of such teachers at par throughout the country, since at higher education level, students from entire country otherwise have no reason of disparity or discrimination, the Government of India enacted National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1993") whereunder an expert body, i.e., National Council for Teacher Education (hereinafter referred to as the "NCTE") was contemplated who was empowered to grant recognition to the Institutions imparting Teachers Training Education so that proper and well trained teachers are available for imparting education to young and raw minds which require a different kind of special training.
10. Act, 1993 is a Central Act enacted by Parliament and after receiving the assent of the President on 29.12.1993 was published in the Gazette of India, (Extra.) Part II, Section 1, dated 30.12.1993. Section 1(3) provides that Act 1993 shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may appoint by notification in initial gazette. Pursuant thereto the Central Government by notification dated 1.07.1995 appointed the same day i.e. 01.7.1995 for enforcement of Act 1993.
11. The Act 1993 was enacted with an objective of achieving planned and coordinated development for teacher education system throughout the country, the regulation and properly maintenance of norms and standards in teacher education system and for matters connected therewith.
12. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and others (2006) 9 SCC 1, Apex Court observed that considering the objective and preamble of the Act and various provisions, it is clear that the aforesaid Act of Parliament is referable to Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution and to the extent the field is occupied by Act 1993 the State Legislature cannot encroach upon the said field.
13. The Act 1993 contemplates establishment of a council called as "National Council For Teacher Education" and its functions are enumerated in detail in Section 12 of Act 1993. It clearly talks of planned and co-ordinated development of teacher education, and determination and maintenance of standards for teacher education. It is in this regard various subjects and functions of NCTE have been enumerated in Section 12 from Clauses (a) to (n) which reads as under:
"(a) undertake surveys and studies relating to various aspects of teacher education and publish the result thereof;
(b) make recommendations to the Central and State Governments, Universities, University Grants Commission and recognised Institutions in the matter of preparation of suitable plans and programmes in the field of teacher education:
(c) co-ordinate and monitor teacher education and its development in the country;
(d) lay down guidelines in respect of minimum qualifications for a person to be employed as a teacher in schools or in recognised institutions.;
(e) lay down norms for any specified category of courses or training in teacher education, including the minimum eligibility criteria for admission thereof, and the method of selection of candidates, duration of the course, course contents and mode of curriculum;
(f) lay down guidelines for compliance by recognised institution for starting new courses or training, and for providing physical and instructional facilities, staffing pattern and staff qualifications;
(g) lay down standards in respect of examinations leading to teacher education qualifications, criteria for admission to such examinations and schemes of courses or training;
(h) lay down guidelines regarding tuition fee and other fee chargeable by recognised institutions;
(i) promote and conduct innovation and research in various areas of teacher education and disseminate the results thereof;
(j) examine and review periodically the implementation of the norms, guidelines and standards laid down by the Council, and to suitably advise the recognised institutions;
(k) evolve suitable performance appraisal systems, norms and mechanisms for enforcing accountability on recognised institutions;
(l) formulated schemes for various levels of teacher education and identify recognised institutions and set up new institutions for teacher development programmes;
(m) take all necessary steps to prevent commercialisation of teacher education; and
(n) perform such other functions as may be entrusted to it by the Central Government."
14. The Act 1993 contemplates recognition and permission of NCTE for running courses or training in teacher education. Section 17 provides, if course or training in teacher education has been imparted or obtained in violation of the provisions of the Act, such course or training shall not be treated a valid qualification for employment under Central and State Government, University, any School/College or other educational body aided by Central or the State Government. The restriction imposed by Section 17(4) is only to the extent that a training or course in teacher education which does not conform to the various provisions of Act 1993 shall not be a valid qualification for employment as stated above, and nothing more and nothing less. The entire Act 1993 does not talk of the manner in which appointments of teachers shall be made, the eligibility to be laid down for appointment of teachers in Primary Schools etc. except qualification. It is confined to the standard and quality of teachers training education. In this regard NCTE obviously can lay down minimum qualification which may be prescribed for appointment of a teacher but it does not control thereafter the mode, manner and other relevant provisions regarding recruitment and appointment of such teachers.
15. In State of U.P. and Others Vs. Bhupendra Nath Tripathi and Ors. 2010 (5) ESC 630, the Apex Court has clearly observed in para 24 that NCTE can lay down minimum qualification for appointment of teacher by competent appointing authority or the authority competent to frame rules and regulations may lay down any qualification over and above the minimum qualification prescribed by NCTE. Para 24 of the judgment in Bhupendra Nath Tripathi (supra) reads as under:
"The is no quarrel with the proposition that the State in its discretion is entitled to prescribe such qualifictions as it may consider appropriate for candidates seeking admission into BTC course so long as the qualifications so prescribed are not lower than those prescribed by or under the NCTE Act. The State can always prescribe higher qualification, ...."
16. Meaning thereby requirement for appointment of a teacher, as contemplated by Act 1993, is that the teacher education must be such as is in conformity with Act 1993 and that the teacher must possess minimum qualification before he is considered for appointment and then on, Act 1993, in my view, stops from that stage and onwards.
17. The Apex Court and this Court have repeatedly held that no person shall be appointed as teacher in primary schools unless he possess requisite qualification of teacher's training which is duly recognised by NCTE under Act, 1993 after its enactment. Once the limitations of NCTE are observed, the power of appointing authority or rule framing authority in the State or by the Board, as the case may be, providing a higher or better qualification has not been checked but duly recognised. The only rider is that the Teachers Training qualification in respect to appointments made after enforcement of Act, 1993 should be such which training qualification has been recognised and approved by NCTE. From what has been discussed above and also considering the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners there is no doubt that to this extent there is no quarrel.
18. If I take up the case in hand, the matter would thereafter be governed by Act 1972 and 1981 Rules. The qualifications required to be possessed by a teacher for appointment in a Primary School is provided in Rule 8 of 1981 Rules. This rule has undergone amendments from time to time broadly. Initially it provides for a qualification up to High School and training qualification like Basic Teachers Certificate, Junior Teacher Certificate, Certificate of Teaching etc. Later on amendments were made which basically increased educational qualification of High School to Intermediate and then to Graduation but so far as training qualification is concerned, the same continued to be as such with some minor additions in the last decade. For the first time, an amendment was made in 2004 by adding "Special Basic Teachers Certificate Course" as one of the training qualification under Rule 8(1). Subsequently another amendment came to be made by notification dated 25.11.2006 in Rule 8(1). To this extent there is no dispute among the parties.
19. In view of above discussion, it thus can be said that after enactment of Act, 1993 the only rider came to apply with respect to recruitment and appointment of Teachers in Primary Schools is that they must possess training qualification approved by NCTE under various provision of Act, 1993 but rest of the matter governed by relevant provisions relating to recruitment and appointment applicable in the concerned province, for example in State of U.P. by Act, 1972 and the Rules framed thereunder.
20. The situation changes when the Apex Court insisted upon to make primary education as a constitutional right of the children in the age group of 6 to 14 years.
21. In fact due to lack of appropriate avenues providing required training to persons making them eligible for Primary Teachers a huge number of vacancies continued to exist in Primary Schools, whether managed by Board or by primage managements. Moreover, the mindless and sometimes wholly illegal and erroneous decisions and activities of authorities in Basic Education Department in State also constitute a lot on their part. The litigation in respect to employment in Primary Schools constitute a major chunk of litigation in this Court in the last two decades and more. The aspirations of people widened with the judgment of Apex Court in Mohini Jain Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 SC 1858 and Unni Krishnan J.P. Vs. State of A.P., AIR 1993 SC 2178 and the cases followed thereafter observing Primary Education to children from age of 6 to 14 years as a constitutional right. Efforts were made by Governments, Central and State both, to expand primary education by establishing primary schools at Village Panchayat level in a major way. This really gave a boomerang to number of schools as also corresponding increase in number of teachers requiring to man these primary institution.
22. The Court has been informed at the Bar that at present the number of primary schools in the State of U.P. are more than one lac and twenty five thousands which obviously mean that number of posts of teachers would also exceed the said figure. 
23. To give boost and to fulfil the devout and pious objective, Parliament also intervened by inserting Article 21A in the Constitution i.e. 'Right to Education', by Constitution (86th Amendment) Act, 2002, and, simultaneously inserting Clause (k) in Article 51A vide Section 4 of Constitution (86th Amendment) Act, 2002. The Parliament also in furtherance of the above constitutional provisions, come forward by enacting "Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009" (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 2009") published in Gazette of Indian on 27.8.2009. By virtue of Section 1(3) of Act 2009, it has been given effect from 01.4.2010.
24. One of the major change it has brought, besides other, is that no Primary School, other than a school established, owned or controlled by the appropriate Government or local body after commencement of Act 2009, shall be established or function without obtaining a certificate of recognition from such authority, as may be prescribed. For the purpose of seeking recognition, the school has to conform the norms and standards specified in Section 19 of Act 2009 read with the schedule appended thereto.
25. Thus situation underwent radical changes after enactment Act, 2009. Section 23 thereof reads as under:
"23. Qualifications for appointment and terms and conditions of service of teachers.--(1) Any person possessing such minimum qualifications, as laid down by an academic authority authorised by the Central Government, by notification, shall be eligible for appointment as a teacher.
(2) Where a State does not have adequate institutions offering courses or training in teacher education, or teachers possessing minimum qualifications as laid down under sub-section (1) are not available in sufficient numbers, the Central Government may, if it deems necessary, by notification, relax the minimum qualifications required for appointment as a teacher, for such period, not exceeding five years, as may be specified in that notification:
Provided that a teacher who, at the commencement of this Act, does not possess minimum qualifications as laid down under sub-section (1), shall acquire such minimum qualifications within a period of five years.
(3) The salary and allowances payable to, and the terms and conditions of service of, teachers shall be such as may be prescribed."
26. The Act 2009, vide Section 23(1), also provides that any person possessing such minimum qualification, as laid down by an academic authority authorised by the Central Government, by notification, shall be eligible for appointment as a teacher. Section 23 (1) therefore talks of only eligibility for appointment as teacher but does not confer any corresponding right upon a person to claim appointment as teacher merely if he fulfills the qualification prescribed under Section (1) of Section 23. Simultaneously there is no corresponding obligation for offering appointment to such person as teacher. The power of State Legislature vide Entry 25 List 3 Schedule VII of the Constitution therefore to the extent it can make provisions for governing primary schools and providing provisions governing recruitment and conditions of service of teachers in such schools is not curtailed in any manner so long as it is not repugnant to any specific Central Act. None as such has been shown to this Court.
27. In exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of Act, 2009, Government of India nominated NCTE as the authorised authority empowering it to frame Regulations laying down qualifications for appointment of teachers in primary schools. In exercise of powers under Section 23 of Act, 2009, NCTE has framed regulations, vide notification dated 23.08.2010 laying down minimum qualifications for a person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in Class 1 to 8 in a school referred to in Clause (n) of Section 2 of Act 2009.
28. Section 2(n) of Act 2009 defines "School" for the purpose of Act 2009 and reads as under:
"school" means any recognised school imparting elementary education and includes-
(i) a school established, owned or controlled by the appropriate Government or local authority;
(ii) an aided school receiving aid or grants to meet whole or part of its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local authority;
(iii) a school belonging to specified category; and
(iv) an unaided school not receiving any kind of aid or grants to meet its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local authority;"
29. The minimum qualification prescribed in notification dated 23.8.2010 are in two parts, one for Junior Primary School namely Classes I to V and another is for Senior Primary School i.e. Class VI to VIII. Besides educational qualifications, for the first time, it also introduced eligibility qualification of teacher i.e. Eligibility Test i.e. passing of Teachers Eligibility Test (in short 'T.E.T.') conducted by concerned Government in accordance with the guidelines laid down by NCTE.
30. Para 3 of notification dated 23.8.2010 provides for "Compulsory Training" and reads as under:
"Training to be undergone.- A person-
(a) with BA/B.Sc. with at least 50% marks and B.Ed qualification shall also be eligible for appointment for class I to V upto 1st January, 2012, provided he undergoes, after appointment, and NCTE recognized 6-month special programme in Elementary Education.
(b) with B.Ed (Special Education) or B. Ed (Special Education) qualification shall undergo, after appointment, an NCTE recognized 6-month special programme in Elementary Education."
31. NCTE issued another notification on 29.7.2011 in purported exercise of powers under Section 23 of Act 2009. The aforesaid notification has amended notification dated 23.8.2010. Sub-para (i) and (ii) of Para 1; para 3 and para 5 have been substituted in entirety. For ready reference, the amended relevant provisions i.e. para 1(i) and (ii) and para 3 reads as under:
"1. Minimum Qualification :-
(i) Classes I-V
(a) Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 2-year Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known)
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 45% marks and 2-year Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known), in accordance with the NCTE (Recognition Norms and Procedure), Regulations, 2002.
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 4-year Bachelor of Elementary Education (B.El.Ed)
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 2-year Diploma in Education (Special Education)
OR
Graduation and two year Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known)
AND
(b) Pass in the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), to be conducted by the appropriate Government in accordance with the Guidelines framed by the NCTE for the purpose.
(ii) Class VI-VIII
(a) Graduation and 2-year Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known)
OR
Graduation with at least 50% marks and 1-year Bachelor in Education (B.Ed.)
OR
Graduation with at least 45% marks and 1-year Bachelor in Education (B.Ed.), in accordance with the NCTE (Recognition Norms and Procedure) Regulations issued from time to time in this regard.
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 4-year Bachelor in Elementary Education (B.El.Ed.)
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 4-year B.A./B.Sc.Ed. or B.A.Ed./B.Sc.Ed.
OR
Graduation with at least 50% marks and 1-year B.Ed. (Special Education)
AND
(b) Pass in Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), to be conducted by the appropriate Government in accordance with the Guidelines framed by the NCTE for the purpose."
32. Para 5 of notification dated 29.7.2011 is a kind of saving clause and provides that if an advertisement initiating process of appointment of teachers has already been issued before 29.7.2011, such appointments may be made in accordance with NCTE (Determination of Minimum Qualifications for Recruitment of Teachers in Schools) Regulations, 2001 (as amended from time to time).
33. Sub para (b) of para 5 provides that minimum qualification prescribed by notification dated 29.7.2011 shall apply to all teachers except the teacher for Physical Education, for which NCTE Regulation dated 03.11.2001, as amended from time to time, shall continue to apply. Further regarding teachers of Art Education, Craft Education, Home Science, Work Education, etc. the existing eligibility norms prescribed by the State Government and other school managements shall be applicable till such time the NCTE lays down the minimum qualification in respect of such teachers.
34. The above discussion makes it beyond doubt that the above notifications issued by NCTE lays down minimum qualification, which would make a person eligible for appointment as a teacher in Primary Schools but the manner in which recruitments for appointment on the post of teacher in Primary School shall be made, and, their terms and conditions of service, for the same, aforesaid notification does not provide anything at all and hence in this regard 1981 Rules shall hold the field and would continue to apply.
35. Now I come to Rule 14, validity whereof has been assailed. It only talks of a procedure in which a recruitment has to be made for appointment of Assistant Teachers in Primary Schools governed by provisions of Act, 1993. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 talks of preparation of a list of the candidates who applied pursuant to an advertisement made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 14. The said list shall be prepared in descending order on the basis of merit obtained in T.E.T. The aforesaid list under sub-rule (5) is to be forwarded by appointing authority to Selection Committee. The Selection Committee thereafter shall proceed to make selection of the candidates whose names find mention in the aforesaid list in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Rule 17 and 17-A of 1981 Rules. The constitution of Selection Committee which would make the above selection is also provided in Rule 16. Therefore, apparently I do not find any inconsistency or repugnancy at all in Rule 14 of 1981 Rules as also Regulations framed by NCTE as well as the provisions of Act, 2009. For the purpose of arranging the names of applicants in descending order under Rule 14(3), the marks obtained in T.E.T. has been made as the guiding factor but for the purpose of selection under Rule 17 and 17-A which is to be made by selection committee a different procedure is prescribed.
36. Be that as it may, even otherwise, in absence of any prohibition under parent statute, it cannot be said that criteria for selection can be laid down by Regulation framing authority, i.e., NCTE.
37. To conclude, I find no merit in the petitioners' challenge to Rule 14, being illegal in any manner. Neither it is inconsistent to any provision which have overriding effect or which may prevail over it nor the aforesaid provision is ultra vires of the Act or Constitution in any manner.
38. No other point or issue pressed.
39. There is no merit in the writ petition.
40. Dismissed.
41. No costs.
Order Date :- 14.12.2011
AK



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Source : http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do?judgmentID=1696717

UPTET Allahabad Highcourt : B. Ed Pursuing Candidates appear for TET Exam or NOT


UPTET Allahabad Highcourt : B. Ed Pursuing Candidates appear for TET Exam or NOT

May be UP Govt. have planing to select candidates on the basis of TET Marks and withing NCTE timeframe, that's why initially B. Ed. Appearing Candidates are not allowed to give TET Exam.


See Case Details :


HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH

?Court No. - 5

Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 6010 of 2011

Petitioner :- Km. Swati Singh & Anr
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Secondary Education & Anr
Petitioner Counsel :- B.K. Singh
Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.

Hon'ble Ritu Raj Awasthi,J.
Notice on behalf of opposite parties no.1 and 2 has been accepted by the learned Chief Standing Counsel, who prays for and is allowed ten days time to seek instructions in the matter.
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as per the guidelines issued by the NCTE on 23.8.2010 a person who is pursuing B. Ed course is permitted to appear in Teacher Eligibility Test. The Central Government for Central Teacher Eligibility Test has fixed the eligibility according to which a candidate appearing in first year B. Ed examination is permitted to appear in the test. However, the State Government has fixed the eligibility of having the B. Ed qualification for appearing in the said test. The persons pursuing the B.Ed. course have not been permitted. 
List this case in the week commending 10.10.2011, as fresh.
Order Date :- 30.9.2011
Prajapati


Source : http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do?judgmentID=1455267

UPTET : Allahabad Highcourt Judgment to Apply any number of District by TET Passed Candidates


Allahabad Highcourt Judgment to Apply any number of District by TET Passed Candidates


The selection could have been made at State level and thereafter candidates could have been allocated to different district to undergo training in the concerned institutions but the respondents have adopted a totally different procedure by restricting number of applications to only five districts which is wholly irrational, arbitrary and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 

The Court has been informed at the Bar that at present the number of primary schools in the State of U.P. are more than one lac and twenty five thousands which obviously mean that number of posts of teachers would also exceed the said figure. 


See Case Details :

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

AFR
Court No. - 33

Case :- WRIT - A No. - 70682 of 2011

Petitioner :- Sarita Shukla & Others 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. & Others
Petitioner Counsel :- Agnihotri Kumar Tripathi
Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C., K.S.Kushwaha,
Chandra Narayan Tripathi

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.
1. Heard Sri Agnihotri Kumar Tripathi for the petitioner and Sri K.S.Kushwaha, learned Standing Counsel for all the respondents.
2. Since a pure legal submission was advanced, learned Standing Counsel stated that he does not propose to file counter affidavit and matter may be heard on merit. I proceed to decide the matter accordingly.
3. The learned counsel for petitioner submitted that advertisement in question to the extent it provides that a candidate should restrict his application for only five districts in U.P. in his/her choice is illegal and ultra vires of the statute.
4. The facts in brief are quite simple. An advertisement has been issued on 29/30.11.2011 with the heading "Selection of Training-Teachers for Primary Schools of U.P. Basic Education Board". While inviting application from eligible and qualified candidates, it provides that one candidate may submit his application for any of the five districts and not more than that. The advertisement contains other details of educational and training qualification, age, nationality and residence, reservation, marital status, character, procedure for submission of the application form, application fee, procedure for selection, six months special training and then clause 10 of the advertisement talks of substantive appointment.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that aforesaid advertisement in so far as restricts a candidate to submit application only in five districts is per se irrational, illegal and arbitrary, hence violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. He contended that there is no logic or reason for confining a candidate to submit application only in five districts and the aforesaid restriction is wholly irrational, has no nexus with the object sought to the achieved and, therefore, is violative of Article 14. He further submitted that it also does not conform with the procedure prescribed in Rule 14(1) of U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules 1981") which talks of district-wise selection and therefore Clause 7 of advertisement as also opening para that one applicant can apply for only five districts is ultra vires of the aforesaid provision of the statute. He lastly submitted that for the purpose of providing six months special training, it is always open to the respondents to adopt any valid procedure but if for the purpose of appointment the said advertisement is to be acted upon, it would be illegal and ultra vires being contrary to the relevant statutory provisions namely 'Rules, 1981.
6. Sri Kushwaha on the contrary submitted that the advertisement has been issued in the light of and consequence to Regulations framed by "National Council for Teachers Education Regulations" notified in Government of India Gazette dated 29.7.2011. It is said that no further advertisement is to be made for making appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher in the Primary Schools maintained by Board and in fact the persons selected pursuant to the impugned advertisement shall be given six months training and on completion thereof shall be issued letters of appointment straightway without any further process of recruitment.
7. In the above backdrop, this Court proceed to examine correctness of advertisement to the extent, impugned in this petition.
8. Before proceeding further it is necessary to clarify some aspect of the matter. One is regarding minimum qualification of teachers and quality of teacher's training constituting essential eligibility for a person before claiming appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher in Primary School; and second, relates to actual process of recruitment and appointment under relevant statutory rules relating to the service concerned.
9. There are three statutes relevant in this matter. One is "Uttar Pradesh Basic Education Act, 1972" (hereinafter referred to as "Act 1972"), Second is "National Council For Teacher Education Act, 1993" (hereinafter referred to "Act 1993") and third is "Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009" (hereinafter referred to as "Act 2009").
10. Prior to the enactment of Act 1972, primary education in the State was in quite disorganized manner. There were two types of Primary Schools running in the entire State. One owned and managed by local bodies and rests were private institutions. In the rural areas, primary schools of first category were being managed by Zila Parishads and in urban areas they were being run by Municipal Boards and Mahapalikas etc. The funds to these schools were the responsibility of concerned local bodies. Privately managed Primary Schools were also having two types of categories, one which were solely managed by private bodies from their own resources and rest were those which were getting some kind of financial grant/assistance from State Government through Education Department or some other Departments like Harijan and Social Welfare etc.
11. Article 41 in Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy) provides that the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing right to work, to education etc. but as a matter of fact effective steps in this regard were wanting. Similarly Article 45 provides that State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of Constitution, free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years but as a matter of fact here also much remain to be done on the part of the State. In early seventies, to bring uniformity in Primary schools run by Local Bodies, considering day to day deteriorating conditions of such schools, a public demand through their representatives was raised requiring State to take immediate steps for improving primary education in the State and hence with an objective of reorganisation, reformation and expanding elementary education, State Government came forward to take over control of such schools, as were being run by Local Bodies into its own hands. It enacted U.P. Basic Education Ordinance 1972 giving effect to its provisions w.e.f. Educational Session 1972-73. The said ordinance was substituted by Act 1972. It provided for establishment of U.P. Board of Basic Education (in short the 'Board') and by virtue of Section 9, all the employees of Primary Schools maintained by local bodies stood transferred and became employee of the Board. Section 19 confers power upon the State Government to frame rules for the purpose of carrying out Act 1972 in general and in particular the recruitment and conditions of service of the persons appointed to the post of officers, teachers and employees under Section 6 and 9 and also in respect to such staff teaching and non teaching of other basic schools recognized by the Board. The provisions of Act 1972 was given overriding effect over otherwise provisions in U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 and U.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1952 by inserting Section 13A w.e.f. 21st June, 1979.
12. All the basic schools virtually in the State of U.P., now, if recognized by the Board, have to conform to the provisions of Act 1972 and the rules framed thereunder.
13. In respect to teachers of Primary Schools maintained by the Board, Rules 1981 have been framed, published in U.P. Gazette (Extra Ordinary) on 03.01.1981. The application of these rules is provided in Rule 3, as under:
"Extent of application.- These rules shall apply to :
(i) All teachers of local bodies transferred to the Board under Section 9 of the Act; and
(ii) all teachers employed for the Basic and Nursery Schools established by the Board."
14. At this stage, I defer further discussion of the aforesaid Rules and find it appropriate to come to the provisions of Act 1993. This is a Central Act enacted by Parliament and after receiving assent of the President on 29.12.1993 was published in the Gazette of India, (Extra.) Part II, Section 1, dated 30.12.1993. Section 1(3) provides that Act 1993 shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may appoint by notification in initial gazette. Pursuant thereto the Central Government by notification dated 1.07.1995 appointed the same day i.e. 01.7.1995 for enforcement of Act 1993.
15. The Act 1993 was enacted with an objective of achieving planned and coordinated development for teacher education system throughout the country, the regulation and properly maintenance of norms and standards in teacher education system and for matters connected therewith.
16. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya and others (2006) 9 SCC 1, Apex Court observed that considering the objective and preamble of the Act and various provisions, it is clear that the aforesaid Act of Parliament is referable to Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution and to the extent the field is occupied by Act 1993 the State Legislature cannot encroach upon the said field.
17. The Act 1993 contemplates establishment of a council called as "National Council For Teacher Education" (hereinafter referred as "NCTE") and its functions are enumerated in detail in Section 12 of Act 1993. It clearly talks of planned and co-ordinated development of teacher education, and determination and maintenance of standards for teacher education. It is in this regard various subjects and functions of NCTE have been enumerated in Section 12 from Clauses (a) to (n) which reads as under: 
"(a) undertake surveys and studies relating to various aspects of teacher education and publish the result thereof;
(b) make recommendations to the Central and State Governments, Universities, University Grants Commission and recognised Institutions in the matter of preparation of suitable plans and programmes in the field of teacher education:
(c) co-ordinate and monitor teacher education and its development in the country;
(d) lay down guidelines in respect of minimum qualifications for a person to be employed as a teacher in schools or in recognised institutions.;
(e) lay down norms for any specified category of courses or training in teacher education, including the minimum eligibility criteria for admission thereof, and the method of selection of candidates, duration of the course, course contents and mode of curriculum;
(f) lay down guidelines for compliance by recognised institution for starting new courses or training, and for providing physical and instructional facilities, staffing pattern and staff qualifications;
(g) lay down standards in respect of examinations leading to teacher education qualifications, criteria for admission to such examinations and schemes of courses or training;
(h) lay down guidelines regarding tuition fee and other fee chargeable by recognised institutions;
(i) promote and conduct innovation and research in various areas of teacher education and disseminate the results thereof;
(j) examine and review periodically the implementation of the norms, guidelines and standards laid down by the Council, and to suitably advise the recognised institutions;
(k) evolve suitable performance appraisal systems, norms and mechanisms for enforcing accountability on recognised institutions;
(l) formulated schemes for various levels of teacher education and identify recognised institutions and set up new institutions for teacher development programmes;
(m) take all necessary steps to prevent commercialisation of teacher education; and
(n) perform such other functions as may be entrusted to it by the Central Government."
18. The Act 1993 contemplates recognition and permission of NCTE for running courses or training in teacher education. Section 17 provides, if course or training in teacher education has been imparted or obtained in violation of the provisions of the Act, such course or training shall not be treated a valid qualification for the purpose of employment under Central Act, State Government, University, any School/College or other educational body aided by Central or the State Government. The restriction imposed by Section 17(4) is only to the extent that a training or course in teacher education which does not conform to the various provisions of Act 1993 shall not be a valid qualification for employment as stated above, and nothing more and nothing less. The entire Act 1993 does not talk of the manner in which appointments of teachers shall be made, the eligibility to be laid down for appointment of teachers in Primary Schools etc. except qualification. It is confined to the standard and quality of teachers education. In this regard NCTE obviously can lay down minimum qualification which may be prescribed for appointment of a teacher but it does not control thereafter the mode, manner and other relevant provisions regarding recruitment and appointment of such teachers.
19. In State of U.P. and Others Vs. Bhupendra Nath Tripathi and Ors. 2010 (5) ESC 630, the Apex Court has clearly observed in para 24 that NCTE can lay down minimum qualification for appointment of teacher by competent appointing authority or the authority competent to frame rules and regulations may lay down any qualification over and above the minimum qualification prescribed by NCTE. Para 24 of the judgment in Bhupendra Nath Tripathi (supra) reads as under:
"The is no quarrel with the proposition that the State in its discretion is entitled to prescribe such qualifictions as it may consider appropriate for candidates seeking admission into BTC course so long as the qualifications so prescribed are not lower than those prescribed by or under the NCTE Act. The State can always prescribe higher qualification, ...."
20. Meaning thereby requirement for appointment of a teacher, as contemplated by Act 1993, is that the teacher education must be such as is in conformity with Act 1993 and that the teacher must possess minimum qualification before he is considered for appointment and then on, Act 1993, in my view, stops from that stage and onwards.
21. If I take up the case in hand, the matter would thereafter be governed by Act 1972 and the Rules 1981. The qualification required to be possessed by a teacher for appointment in a Primary School is provided in Rule 8 of Rules 1981. This rule has undergone amendments from time to time broadly. Initially it provides for a qualification up to High School and training qualification like Basic Teachers Certificate, Junior Teacher Certificate, Certificate of Teaching etc. Later on amendments were made which basically increase educational qualification of High School to Intermediate and then to Graduation but so far as training qualification is concerned, the same continue to be as such. For the first time, an amendment was made in 2004 by adding "Special Basic Teachers Certificate Course" as one of the training qualification under Rule 8(1). Subsequently another amendment came to be made by notification dated 25.11.2006 in Rule 8(1). To this extent there is no dispute among the parties.
22. The large scale employment in Primary Schools maintained by Board constitute a major chunk of litigation before this Court in the last 20 years and more. The reason being the large number of schools and quantum of employment generated thereby.
23. The Basic Education authorities, time and against have also contributed a lot, either by their mindless activities or deliberate and otherwise illegal acts. In fact after the judgement of Apex Court in Mohini Jain Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 SC 1858 and Unni Krishnan J.P. Vs. State of A.P., AIR 1993 SC 2178 and the cases followed thereafter observing Primary Education to children from age of 6 to 14 years as a constitutional right, efforts were made by Governments, Central and State both, to expand primary education by establishing primary schools at Village Panchayat level in a major way and this really give a boomerang to number of schools as also corresponding increase in number of teachers requiring to man these institution.
24. The Court has been informed at the Bar that at present the number of primary schools in the State of U.P. are more than one lac and twenty five thousands which obviously mean that number of posts of teachers would also exceed the said figure. 
25. It would be appropriate at this stage to remind that Parliament also recognized above right by inserting Article 21A in the Constitution i.e. 'Right to Education', by Constitution (86th Amendment) Act, 2002, and, simultaneously inserting Clause (k) in Article 51A vide Section 4 of Constitution (86th Amendment) Act, 2002. The Parliament also in furtherance of the above constitutional provisions, come forward by enacting Act 2009 published in Gazette of Indian on 27.8.2009. By virtue of Section 1(3) of Act 2009, it has been given effect from 01.4.2010.
26. One of the major change it has brought, besides other, is that no Primary School other than a school established, owned or controlled by the appropriate Government or local body after commencement of 2009 Act shall be established or function without obtaining a certificate of recognition from such authority, as may be prescribed. For the purpose of seeking recognition, the school has to conform the norms and standard specified in Section 19 of Act 2009 read with the schedule appended thereto. The Act 2009, vide Section 23(1), also provides that any person possessing such minimum qualification, as laid down by an academic authority authorised by the Central Government, by notification, shall be eligible for appointment as a teacher. Section 23 (1) therefore also talks of only eligibility for appointment as teacher but does not confer any corresponding right upon a person to claim appointment as teacher merely if he fulfills the qualification prescribed under Section (1) of Section 23. Simultaneously there is no corresponding obligation for offering appointment to such person as teacher. The power of State Legislature vide Entry 25 List 3 Schedule VII of the Constitution therefore to the extent it make provisions for governing primary schools and providing provisions governing recruitment and conditions of service of teachers in such school is not curtailed in any manner.
27. Now, I come to the basic provision made by NCTE which has been referred to by Sri Kushwaha, learned counsel appearing for respondents. The Department of School Education and Literacy, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India by notification No.S.O. 750 (E) dated 31.3.2010 authorised NCTE as academic authority to prescribe minimum qualification for appointment of a teacher. Consequently, with reference to Section 23(1) NCTE issued notification dated 23.8.2010 laying down minimum qualifications for a person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in Class 1 to 8 in a school referred to in Clause (n) of Section 2 of 2009 Act.
28. Section 2(n) of 2009 Act defines "School" for the purpose of 2009 Act and reads as under:
"school" means any recognised school imparting elementary education and includes-
(i) a school established, owned or controlled by the appropriate Government or local authority;
(ii) an aided school receiving aid or grants to meet whole or part of its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local authority;
(iii) a school belonging to specified category; and
(iv) an unaided school not receiving any kind of aid or grants to meet its expenses from the appropriate Government or the local authority;"
29. The minimum qualification prescribed in notification dated 23.8.2010 are in two parts, one for Junior Primary School namely Classes I to V and another is for Senior Primary School i.e. Class VI to VIII. Besides educational qualifications, for the first time, it also introduced eligibility qualification of teacher i.e. Eligibility Test i.e. passing of Teachers Eligibility Test (in short 'T.E.T.') conducted by concerned Government in accordance with the guidelines laid down by NCTE. Para 3 of notification dated 23.8.2010 provides for compulsory training qualification and it reads as under:
"Training to be undergone.- A person-
(a) with BA/B.Sc. with at least 50% marks and B.Ed qualification shall also be eligible for appointment for class I to V upto 1st January, 2012, provided he undergoes, after appointment, and NCTE recognized 6-month special programme in Elementary Education.
(b) with B.Ed (Special Education) or B. Ed (Special Education) qualification shall undergo, after appointment, an NCTE recognized 6-month special programme in Elementary Education."
30. NCTE issued a notification on 29.7.2011 in purported exercise of powers under Section 23 of 2009 Act. The aforesaid notification has amended notification dated 23.8.2010. Sub-para (i) and (ii) of Para 1; para 3 and para 5 have been substituted in entirety. For ready reference, the amended relevant provisions i.e. para 1(i) and (ii) and para 3 reads as under:
"1. Minimum Qualification :-
(i) Classes I-V
(a) Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 2-year Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known)
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 45% marks and 2-year Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known), in accordance with the NCTE (Recognition Norms and Procedure), Regulations, 2002.
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 4-year Bachelor of Elementary Education (B.El.Ed)
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 2-year Diploma in Education (Special Education)
OR
Graduation and two year Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known)
AND
(b) Pass in the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), to be conducted by the appropriate Government in accordance with the Guidelines framed by the NCTE for the purpose.
(ii) Class VI-VIII
(a) Graduation and 2-year Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known)
OR
Graduation with at least 50% marks and 1-year Bachelor in Education (B.Ed.)
OR
Graduation with at least 45% marks and 1-year Bachelor in Education (B.Ed.), in accordance with the NCTE (Recognition Norms and Procedure) Regulations issued from time to time in this regard.
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 4-year Bachelor in Elementary Education (B.El.Ed.)
OR
Senior Secondary (or its equivalent) with at least 50% marks and 4-year B.A./B.Sc.Ed. or B.A.Ed./B.Sc.Ed.
OR
Graduation with at least 50% marks and 1-year B.Ed. (Special Education)
AND
(b) Pass in Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), to be conducted by the appropriate Government in accordance with the Guidelines framed by the NCTE for the purpose." 
31. Para 5 of notification dated 29.7.2011 is a kind of saving clause and provides that if an advertisement initiating process of appointment of teachers has already been issued before 29.7.2011, such appointments may be made in accordance with NCTE (Determination of Minimum Qualifications for Recruitment of Teachers in Schools) Regulations, 2001 (as amended from time to time).
32. Sub para (b) of para 5 provides that minimum qualification prescribed by notification dated 29.7.2011 shall apply to all teachers except the teacher for Physical Education, for which NCTE Regulation dated 03.11.2001, as amended from time to time, shall continue to apply. Further regarding teachers of Art Education, Craft Education, Home Science, Work Education, etc. the existing eligibility norms prescribed by the State Government and other school managements shall be applicable till such time the NCTE lays down the minimum qualification in respect of such teachers.
33. The above discussion makes it beyond doubt that the above notifications issued by NCTE lays down minimum qualification, which would make a person eligible for appointment as a teacher in Primary Schools but the manner in which recruitments for appointment on the post of teacher in Primary School shall be made, and, their terms and conditions of service, for the same, aforesaid notification does not provide anything at all and hence in this regard Rules 1981 shall hold the field and would continue to apply.
34. Sri Kushwaha, learned Standing Counsel vehemently contended that advertisement dated 29/30.11.2011 contemplates requisite six months training contemplated in para 3 of Notification dated 29.7.2011 and for that purpose respondents authorities cannot be compelled to go to observe procedure prescribed in Rule 14(1) of Rules 1981 hence scrutiny of advertisement in question cannot be made with reference to Rules 1981. To the extent the argument is limited for making selection of persons for providing six months training contemplated in para 3 of the notification dated 29.7.2011, this court Court finds no hesitation in upholding the contention of Sri Kushwaha. The respondents need not go to follow the procedure prescribed in Rule 14(1) of Rules 1981 for the purpose of selecting persons for six months Special training and there is no difficulty.
35. If that would have been the matter, it could have rest thereat. But then the clause assailed by the petitioners has to be examined in the light of the provisions of the Constitution namely Article 14. NCTE does not lay down the manner in which any person would be selected for undergoing training in six months contemplated in para 3 of the notification dated 29.7.2011 except of providing certain relaxation for reserved category candidates which is not the matter of dispute in the present case. It is the Secretary of the Board under whose authority the advertisement in question has been published containing a condition restricting a candidate from submitting his application in more than five districts. 
36. Admittedly, selection is not being made for any individual Primary School or Primary Schools constituted in a particular area namely local area or the district. If this Court treat the advertisement in question that it confine only for the purpose of selecting candidates to undergo training contemplated in para 3 of NCTE notification dated 29.7.2011, the Court finds no rationality or logic by confining a candidate to apply only for five districts and not more than that. Paras 7 and 8 of the advertisement shows that every candidate has to apply separately in different districts. Meaning therefore the selection is confined to a particular district. The District constitute a unit of selection. The candidate may be resident of any district in the State of U.P. but he may choose the district for submitting his application on his own and submit application for selection for special training pursuant to the said advertisement. However, out of the existing 75 district in the State of U.P. a candidate has been restricted for submitting applications in only five districts. What is the criteria or principle behind the condition of restricting a candidate from applying for more than five districts is not discernible from the entire advertisement. When the selection is to be made on District Level basis, if it is possible for a candidate, why he cannot apply in as much as district as he can is beyond comprehension.
37. One of the possible ground suggested is if the candidate are permitted to apply in all the districts irrespective of any restriction with regard to number of districts, quantity of applications may become unmanageable and therefore for practical convenience, restriction has been made that a candidate should not apply for more than five districts. But the restriction to five districts and not more or less thereto is not understandable. It is not commensurating to the Commissionerates/Divisions or otherwise but appears that just a figure of five districts taken from Hat has been mentioned in the advertisement, impugned in this case. With regard to selecting number of districts as five in the above advertisement no rationality or logic could be provided by the respondents. One can understand if the selection would have been made on Provincial level then there cannot be any restriction on number of districts unless so provided by some Statute. The selection could have been made at State level and thereafter candidates could have been allocated to different district to undergo training in the concerned institutions but the respondents have adopted a totally different procedure by restricting number of applications to only five districts which is wholly irrational, arbitrary and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 
38. It is well settled that in the matter of selection and appointment etc. the policy decisions can be taken by the State and the same are not lightly to be interfered by the Court in judicial review but if such policy decision is ex facie irrational, illogical and arbitrary, it can be axed by the Courts while going for judicial review. The respondents in the absence of the counter affidavit had the opportunity to show deliberation available on record, if any, made while formulating the above policy to show justification or rationality for restricting a candidate in applying in only five districts but that option has not been availed by the respondents though they have opportunity to do so. No such request was made. It appears that on this aspect there is not even deliberation on the part of the respondents. In a sheer momentary flash this condition has been made part of the process of selection without applying mind to its logic and rationality. It is also not discernible as to whether any rational object the respondents intent to achieve by making this restriction. The said condition also fails ex facie to show any nexus with the undisclosed objectives sought to be achieved. It is well settled that any policy decision, which is ex facie arbitrary, irrational or illogical is vilative of Article 14 and cannot sustain. 
39. I need not burden this judment with catena of authorities on this aspect since the law is now well settled. The aforesaid condition, therefore, is difficult to sustain and has to be struck down accordingly.
40. Sri Kushwaha, learned counsel for the respondents drew my attention to para 10 of the advertisement which provides that those candidates who shall successfully complete training of six months, be appointed on substantive basis on the post of teacher following the procedure prescribed in Rules 1981, as amended by 12th amendment of 2011. To my mind, para 12 of the advertisement nowhere contemplate or empower respondents in issuing straightway, appointment letter as soon as a candidate complete special training of six months but makes it very clear that Rules 1981 thereafter shall be followed for making substantive appointment which include within itself the procedure prescribed in Rule 14(1) of Rules 1981. On a query made, Sri Kushwaha stated as per his instructions no further advertisement as contemplated in Rule 14(1) of Rules 1981 is contemplated and appointments shall be made straightway by issuing letter of appointment by competent appointing authority i.e. District Basic Education Officer. I do not find any reason to go by the above statement made on behalf of the respondents and instead find it sufficient to make it clear and beyond doubt that respondents before issuing letters of appointment, appointing any person as teacher in a Primary School, shall without fail, observe and follow strictly procedure prescribed in Rules 1981 including that of Rule 14(1) so long it continue to operate, and only thereafter appointment shall be made and not otherwise. It is worthy to notice at this stage that repeatedly this Court has observed that an appointment to the post of teacher in a Primary School cannot be made without observing the procedure laid down in Rules 1981.
41. The writ petition, in view of the above discussion, succeed and is allowed. The impugned advertisement dated 30.11.2011 in so far it restricts a candidate in submitting application only for five districts is hereby quashed. 
42. Since as a result of quashing of the aforesaid condition, the candidates have necessarily to be given opportunity to make/submit applications for various districts, the respondents shall issue a fresh advertisement consistent with the directions as above. It is also and further directed that after completion of special training of six months, no appointment on the post of teacher in Primary Schools governed by Rules 1981 shall be made without following the procedure prescribed therein including rule 14(1) as amended from time to time so long it is operating.
43. The Court finds that due to unmindful acts of the respondents, the candidates like petitioners aspiring for appointment in primary schools in large number are running from pillar to post and hence harassed. Hence, the petitioners are also entitled to cost which is quantified to Rs.10,000/-.
Order Date :- 12.12.2011
KA/Akn


Source : http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do?judgmentID=1576162

UPTET : Challenging TET Qualification used for Selection of Teacher is Unfair, Court Dismissed its Petition


UPTET : Challenging TET Qualification used for Selection of Teacher is Unfair, Court Dismissed its Petition

Case was fought  by Siddharth Khare, Ashok Khare as Petitioner Counsel, But there petition is Dismissed by the Court. 

Selection through TET Merit instead of Academic Merit

See Case Details 

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

Court No. - 33

Case :- WRIT - A No. - 71558 of 2011

Petitioner :- Seeta Ram
Respondent :- State Of U.P. & Others
Petitioner Counsel :- Siddharth Khare, Ashok Khare
Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C., Suresh Singh

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.
1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate, and perused the record.
2. Petitioner is challenging advertisement dated 29/30.11.2011 as also Rule 14 (3) of U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1981"). It is contended that National Council for Teachers Eduction (hereinafter referred to as "NCTE") provided minimum qualification for appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher in Primary Schools and passing of Teacher Eligibility Test (hereinafter referred to as "TET") conducted by appropriate Government in accordance with the guidelines given by NCTE was made essential qualification. Pursuant thereto the State Government conducted TET on 13.11.2011 result whereof was declared on 25.11.2011. Petitioner passed said test. In the meantime, Rules,1981 were amended by notification dated 9.11.2011 vide U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service (Twelfth Amendment) Rules, 2011 which came into force at once. It made amendment in Rules 8, 14, 27 and 29. Rule 8 was with reference to qualifications and Rule 14 with reference to procedure to be followed for recruitment for appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher in Primary SchoolsThe amendment incorporates TET as a part of essential qualification besides others and Rule 14 (3) provides that a list of the candidates of such persons who appear to possess prescribed academic qualification and eligible for appointment shall be prepared wherein their names shall be arranged in such manner that their names are placed in the descending order on the basis of marks in Teacher Eligibility Test conducted by Government of Uttar Pradesh. Pursuant to the said amendment in the Rules, an advertisement was published on 29/30.11.2011 for selection for appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher in Primary School which is consistent to the said amendment in the Rules. Sri Khare submitted that TET is one of the qualifying examination prescribed by NCTE and the process of such examination commenced before 13.11.2011 pursuant whereto the examination was held on 13.11.2011 and the result was declared on 25.11.2011. For the purpose of making selection and appointment as Assistant Teacher the said qualification cannot be made a basis/foundation particularly considering the process of the said test as it amounts to change of rules of the game when the game has already commenced and in support thereof placed reliance on judgements of this Court in K. Manjusree Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another (2008) 3 SCC 512 and Hemani Malhotra Vs. High Court of Delhi (2008) 7 SCC 11.
3. He further submitted that a qualifying test cannot be made sole basis for selection to the post of Assistant Teacher and in this regard placed reliance on a Full Bench Judgement in Uma Shankar Singh & others Vs. Chairman, Public Service Commission (1994) 2 UPLBEC 1412 and Apex Court decision in Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission Vs. Baloji Badhavath & others (2009) 5 SCC 1.
4. However, I find no force in the submission.
5. The examination held by State Government, i.e. TET, 2011 is pursuant to Regulations framed by NCTE under the provisions of Right to Education Act, 2009 and it only confers a qualification upon a candidate so as to make him eligible to participate in the process of recruitment whenever it commences for appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher. The advertisement dated 29/30.11.2011 is not a commencement of the process of recruitment pursuant to Rules, 1981(as amended) for appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher. Training prescribed therein i.e. six months special training is pre appointment training contemplated under the Regulations framed by NCTE and has nothing to do with the process of recruitment in service. It shall commence with the advertisement published as contemplated in Rule 14 of Rules, 1981. It is in these circumstances, it cannot be said that rules of the game have been changed afterwards inasmuch the two processes cover different fields and operate totally differently.
6. In K. Manjusree (supra) a selection was held but during the process of selection, criteria for selection was changed. It is in these circumstances, the Apex Court said that the Rules of game cannot be changed afterwards i.e. after the interview was over. Similar was the position in Hemani Malhotra (supra) and both the judgements, therefore, have no application to the facts of this case.
7. In Uma Shankar Singh (Supra), it was clearly prescribed that the preliminary examination is a mere screening test and that being so this Court held that it cannot be included for the purpose of final examination. The judgement has no application to the present case.
8. In Baloji Badhavath (supra), it was held that a procedure evolved for laying down mode and manner for consideration of a right to be considered for appointment can be interfered with only when it is arbitrary, discriminatory or wholly unfair, which learned counsel for petitioner failed to prove in the case in hand and, therefore, reliance placed thereon is totally misconceived.
9. So far as making of qualifying examination basis of selection is concerned, it is always permissible to the rules framing authority to determine the criteria for selection which may base on the merits of the candidate possessed in various academic qualifications or qualifying test or any other criteria which may otherwise be valid and once it is so determined, unless it can be said that the same amendment in the rule is contrary to any statutory provision or otherwise ultra vires or vitiated in law, the same cannot be interfered. 
10. In the result, writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed. 
Dt. 12.12.2011
PS


Source : http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do?judgmentID=1582274

UPTET : Exemplary Punishment by Allahabad Highcourt To Those Who Abuses TET (Teacher Eligibility Test ) Passed Candidates


UPTET : Exemplary Punishment by Allahabad Highcourt To Those Who Abuses TET (Teacher Eligibility Test ) Passed Candidates 

Allahabad High court found baseless allegation over TET passed candidates (Such cases repeatedly comes in court and waste time of court also)

See Case Details :

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

?Court No. - 33

Case :- WRIT - A No. - 1337 of 2012

Petitioner :- Satya Pal Singh & Others
Respondent :- Union Of India & Others
Petitioner Counsel :- Rajjan Lal
Respondent Counsel :- A.S.G.I.,C.S.C. (2012/277)

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.
1. Learned counsel for petitionerdespite repeated query could not clarify as to why he has filed this writ petition and in what manner he intend to challenge the notification dated 7.9.2011 issued by Secretary, U.P. Government, Lucknow (Annexure 2 to writ petition). He contended that Teachers Eligibility Test conducted by Board of Secondary Education has not been conducted in accordance with guidelines laid down by National Council of Teachers Education along with its letter dated 11.2.2011 and drew my attention to para 2 thereof which reads as under: 
?2. In accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009, the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) has laid down the minimum qualifications for a person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in class I to VIII, vide its Notification dated August 23, 2010. A copy of the Notification is attached as Annexure 1. One of the essential qualifications for a person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in any of the Schools referred to in clause (n) of section 2 of the RTE Act is that he/she should pass the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) which will be conducted by the appropriate Government.? 
2. On repeated query made from him as to how the said guidelines were not followed, he contended that the direction contained therein that it shall be ensured that the persons recruited as teachers posses the essential aptitude and ability to meet the challenges of teaching at the primary and upper primary level has not been observed in conducting the aforesaid examination and the examining body is guilty of unfair means and unsuitable selections have been made illegally. However, he could not show any thing specifically despite repeated query but in a generalized and vague manner said that all the persons who have passed the examination are neither qualified nor suitable candidates. This is clearly a derogatory remark not only against the examining body but also against lacs of people who participated in the examination and passed the same. The statement is made in a most careless and reckless manner which, in my view, clearly amounts to abuse of process of laws and, therefore, the writ petition must be dismissed with exemplary cost.
3. Dismissed.
4. Since petitioner is not only guilty of making unfounded aspersions against examining body, but also against the persons who have passed the examination, he must pay exemplary cost. I quantify the cost to Rs. 4.5 lacs.
5. The aforesaid amount shall be paid by petitioner to respondent no. 3 who, after receiving the amount, shall distribute the same amongst all the candidate who have passed the examination finally paying Rs. 1/- to each successful candidate.
Dt. 12.1.2012
PS-1337/12


Source : http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do?judgmentID=1633376

UPTET : TET Passed Candidates Shown Anger and Warned for Andolan



टीईटी पास अभ्यर्थियों का गुस्सा फूटा
(UPTET : TET Passed Candidates Shown Anger and Warned for Andolan )

Varanasi / Sonbhadra दुद्धी। सपा सरकार द्वारा घोषणा पत्र में उल्लिखित बेरोजगारी भत्ते पर सरकार ने मुहर तक लगा दी है। उधर नौकरी की आस में टकटकी लगाए टीईटी अभ्यर्थियों ने तत्काल नौकरी न मिलने पर आंदोलन की चेतावनी दी है
बैठक को संबोधित करते हुए टीईटी परीक्षा करने वाले अभ्यर्थियों ने कहा कि बेरोजगारी भत्ते से कहीं ज्यादा नौकरी जरूरी है। पिछली सरकार ने इसकी औपचारिकताओं को काफी हद तक पूरा कर दिया है। राजनीतिक प्रतिद्वंद्विता की भेंट आम अभ्यर्थी चढ़ रहे हैं। उन्होंने कहा कि पिछली सरकार ने नवंबर महीने में टीईटी परीक्षा आयोजित की थी। रिजल्ट के बाद नियुक्ति की प्रक्रिया शुरू हुई, लेकिन बीच में चुनाव की प्रक्रिया शुरू हो गई। चुनाव समाप्त होनेे तथा सरकार के गठन होने के एक महीने बाद भी मुख्यमंत्री ने अभ्यर्थियों के पक्ष में कोई स्पष्ट निर्णय नहीं किया। वक्ताओं ने युवाओं को टीईटी मेरिट के आधार पर नौकरी देने का आग्रह किया। बैठक में भोलानाथ , अजय अग्रहरि, अविनाश गुप्ता, रमाकांत पाठक, हसीन, विजय कृष्ण आदि उपस्थित थे।



मेरिट के आधार पर हो भर्ती

मंडी धनौरा। टीईटी पास अभ्यर्थियों ने मुख्य सचिव को एक ज्ञापन फैक्स कर मांग की है कि शिक्षकों की भर्ती मेरिट के आधार पर की जाए न कि टीईटी के परीक्षा परिणाम के आधार पर। अभ्यर्थियों ने कहा है कि टीईटी पात्रता परीक्षा है न कि चयन का आधार। पत्र प्रेषित करने वालों में दिग्विजय राणा, अंकुर शर्मा, अमित मिश्रा, देवेन्द्र कुमार, ब्रिजेश कुमार, मुकुल, शाहनाबाज, योगेश त्यागी शामिल थे।


News : Amar Ujala (8.4.12)

UPTET : Teachers are continuously retired , But no recruitment


सेवानिवृत्त हो रहे शिक्षक, नियुक्ति नहीं
(UPTET : Teachers are continuously retired , But no recruitment )

मेरठ। जनपद में बेसिक शिक्षा में लगातार शिक्षकों की कमी हो रही है। साइंस और गणित के अध्यापकों की सबसे ज्यादा कमी है। साथ ही टीईटी मामले के बाद से बेसिक में एक भी नियुक्ति नहीं हुई है। बेसिक शिक्षा के आंकड़ों के अनुसार पिछली बार ग्रामीण क्षेत्र में लगभग प्राइमरी में 61 और जूनियर में 51 शिक्षक सेवानिवृत्त हुए थे और नगर क्षेत्र में प्राइमरी व जूनियर के लगभग 40 शिक्षक थे। लगभग 151 शिक्षकों सेवानिवृत्त हुए थे। प्रभारी बीएसए भारत भूषण ने बताया कि इस साल भी लगभग 150 के आसपास शिक्षकों के सेवानिवृत्त होने की उम्मीद है

News : Amar Ujala (8.4.12)

UPTET : टीईटी के 'मायाजाल' को भेदने की तैयारी !



UPTET : टीईटी के 'मायाजाल' को भेदने की तैयारी !


सहारनपुर, जागरण संवाददाता : टीइटी के 'मायाजाल' को भेदने के लिए आलाअधिकारी माथापच्ची में जुटे हैं। परीक्षा रद करने को लेकर ऊहापोह की स्थिति है। अफसरों का मानना है कि यदि प्रक्रिया रद की गई तो इसका हाल भी बीटीसी-2001 जैसा हो जायेगा। इसमें सरकार को बड़ी कानूनी उलझनों का सामना करना पड़ सकता है। नए विकल्पों की तलाश में अधिकारी गुडवर्क में जुटे हैं और पूरा मामला प्रदेश सरकार के विचाराधीन है।

प्राथमिक स्कूलों में शिक्षक पदों पर नियुक्ति का इंतजार कर रहे टीइटी अभ्यर्थी असमंजस से गुजर रहे हैं। नियुक्ति के लिए समस्त बेसिक शिक्षा अधिकारी की ओर से विज्ञापन जारी किया गया था, जिसे नियम विरुद्ध बताते हुए हाईकोर्ट में चुनौती दी गई थी। प्रक्रिया पर हाईकोर्ट द्वारा रोक लगाई गई है। दूसरी ओर टीइटी घोटाले में निदेशक माध्यमिक शिक्षा संजय मोहन सहित आधा दर्जन अन्य लोग गिरफ्तार किए जा चुके हैं। घोटाले की जांच में कई और अधिकारियों के लपेटे में आने की संभावना से इंकार नहीं किया जा सकता।

प्रक्रिया रद हुई तो बड़ा उलटफेर!
विभागीय सूत्रों के मुताबिक यदि टीइटी प्रक्रिया रद्द हुई तो बड़े उलटफेर की संभावना से इंकार नहीं किया जा सकता। टीइटी का बीटीसी-2001 जैसा हश्र न हो, इसे ध्यान में रखते हुए आलाअधिकारी ऐसा फ्रेमवर्क तैयार करने में जुटे है कि मौजूदा प्रक्रिया को ही सिरे चढ़ा दिया जाए। इसके पीछे अफसरों का मानना है कि ऐसा किए जाने की स्थिति में भविष्य की बड़ी कानूनी उलझनों से बचा जा सकेगा। दूसरा यह कि काउंसलिंग के दौरान अभ्यर्थी से ओएमआर की तृतीय प्रति व टीइटी प्रमाणपत्र मूल रूप में मंगाया जाये तथा इंटरनेट पर घोषित रिजल्ट से उक्त प्रमाण-पत्र की जांच की जायेगी

यह थी टीइटी परीक्षा

प्रदेश शासन द्वारा टीईटी का जिम्मा माध्यमिक शिक्षा परिषद को सौंपा था। 13 नवंबर को प्राथमिक व उच्च प्राथमिक स्तर की परीक्षा प्रदेश के सभी मंडल मुख्यालयों पर कराई गई थी। प्राइमरी के घोषित रिजल्ट में 2.70 लाख से अधिक अभ्यर्थी उत्तीर्ण हुए थे। प्राथमिक शिक्षकों की नियुक्ति के टीइटी उत्तीर्ण अभ्यर्थियों से जिला शिक्षा एवं प्रशिक्षण संस्थानों में नौ जनवरी तक आवेदन पत्र मांगे गए थे। माध्यमिक शिक्षा परिषद द्वारा जनवरी के दूसरे पखवाड़े में संयुक्त शिक्षा निदेशक कार्यालयों से टीइटी प्रमाणपत्रों का वितरण कराया गया था।


News : Jagran (7.4.12)

Saturday, April 7, 2012

Official Announcement of CM regarding meeting with TET Candidates and formation of commission under Chief Secretary


Official Announcement of CM regarding meeting with TET Candidates and formation of commission under Chief Secretary

See : http://information.up.nic.in/View_Hindinews.aspx?id=43







JUDICIAL ACTIVISM UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION’ / PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL)


JUDICIAL ACTIVISM UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION’  / PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL)


Source : http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/speeches/speeches_2009/judicial_activism_tcd_dublin_14-10-09.pdf

1
‘JUDICIAL ACTIVISM UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION’
Address by Hon’ble Mr. K.G. Balakrishnan, Chief Justice of India                (Trinity College Dublin, Ireland – October 14, 2009)
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I am indeed very grateful for the opportunity to speak about the evolution of judicial activism in the Indian legal system. Before I touch on the subject, I must of course emphasise the fact that during the framing of
the Indian Constitution in the 1940’s, the engrafting of Directive Principles of State Policy was inspired from the Irish example. The common experience of colonial rule in both countries also makes it viable for us to
draw comparative insights in the matter of analysing legislations, the judicial process and of course precedents themselves.
The phrase ‘judicial activism’ carries more than one connotation. The common law tradition conceives of courtroom litigation as an adversarial process where the onus is on the pleaders to shape the overall course of the proceedings through their submissions. In this conception, the role of the judge is cast in a passive mould and the objective is to dispassionately evaluate the arguments made by both sides. However the actual experience of a courtroom clearly bears witness to the tendency on part of some judges to pose incisive questions before  the practitioners. This may have the consequence of proceedings being judicially-directed to  a certain degree.

While this literal understanding of activism from the bench may have its supporters as well as detractors, the  focus of my talk will be on another understanding of ‘judicial activism’. In the Indian context, there has  2
been a raging debate on the proper scope  and limits of the judicial role – especially of that played by the higher judiciary which consists of the Supreme Court of India at the Centre and the High Courts in the various
States that form the Union of India.  The terms of that debate have been broadly framed with respect to the considerations of ensuring an effective ‘separation of powers’ between the executive, legislature and the judiciary as well as concerns about the efficacy and legitimacy of judicial interventions in the long-run. In the course of this talk, I will attempt to present some background information as well as the main themes of these debates.  

The place of ‘judicial review’  In post-independence India, the inclusion of explicit provisions for ‘judicial review’ were necessary in order to give effect to the individual and group rights guaranteed in the text of the Constitution. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who chaired the drafting committee  of our Constituent Assembly, had
described the provision related to the same as the ‘heart of the Constitution’.
Article 13(2) of the Constitution of India prescribes that the Union or the States shall not make any law that  takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights, and any law  made in contravention of the aforementioned mandate shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.

While judicial review over administrative action has evolved on the lines of common law doctrines such as ‘proportionality’, ‘legitimate expectation’, ‘reasonableness’ and principles of natural justice, the Supreme Court of India and the various High Courts were given the power to rule on the constitutionality of legislative as well as administrative actions. In most cases, the power of judicial review is exercised to protect and enforce the 3 fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. The higher courts are also approached to rule  on questions of legislative competence, mostly in the context of Centre-State relations since Article 246 of the Constitution read with the 7th  schedule, contemplates a clear demarcation as
well as a zone of intersection between the law-making powers of the Union Parliament and the various State Legislatures.

Hence the scope of judicial review before Indian courts has evolved in  three dimensions – firstly, to ensure fairness in administrative action, secondly to protect the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights of
citizens and thirdly to rule on questions of legislative competence between the centre and the states. The power  of the Supreme Court of India to enforce these fundamental rights is derived from Article 32 of the Constitution. It gives citizens the right to directly approach the Supreme Court for seeking remedies against the violation of these fundamental rights. 

This entitlement to constitutional remedies is itself a fundamental right and can be enforced in the form of  writs evolved in common law – such as habeas corpus (to direct the release of a person detained unlawfully),
mandamus (to direct a public authority to do its duty),  quo warranto (to direct a person to vacate an office assumed wrongfully),  prohibition (to prohibit a lower court from proceeding on a case) and certiorari (power of the higher court to remove a proceeding from a lower court and bring it before itself). Besides the Supreme Court, the High Courts located in the various States are also designated  as constitutional courts and Article 226 permits citizens to file similar writs before the High Courts.

With the advent of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in recent decades, 4 Article 32 has been creatively interpreted to shape innovative remedies such as a ‘continuing mandamus’ for ensuring that executive  agencies comply with judicial directions. In this category of litigation, judges have also imported private law remedies such as ‘injunctions’ and ‘stay orders’ into what are essentially public law-related matters.
1  Successful challenges against statutory provisions result in reliefs such as the striking down of
statutes or even reading down of statutes, the latter implying that courts reject a particular approach to the  interpretation of a statutory provision rather than rejecting the provision in its entirety.

2 Beginning with the first few instances in the late-1970’s, the category of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) has  come to be associated with its own ‘people-friendly’ procedures. The foremost change came in the form of the dilution of the requirement of ‘locus standi’ for initiating proceedings. Since the intent was to improve access to justice for those who were otherwise too poor to move the courts  or were unaware of their legal entitlements, the Court allowed actions to be brought on their behalf by social activists and lawyers.

3  In numerous instances, the Court took  suo moto cognizance of matters involving the abuse of prisoners, bonded labourers and inmates of mental institutions, through letters addressed to sitting judges.

This practice of initiating proceedings on the basis of letters has now been streamlined and has come to be described as ‘epistolary jurisdiction’. 
In Public Interest Litigation (PIL), the nature of proceedings itself does not exactly fit into the accepted common-law framework of adversarial litigation. The courtroom dynamics are substantially different from ordinary civil or criminal appeals. While an adversarial environment may prevail in cases where actions are brought to highlight administrative apathy or the government’s condonation of abusive practices, in most public interestrelated litigation, the judges take on a far more active role in the literal sense as well by posing questions to the parties as well as exploring solutions.

Especially in actions seeking directions for ensuring governmental accountability or environmental protection, the orientation of the proceedings is usually more akin to  collective problem-solving rather than an acrimonious contest between the counsels. Since these matters are filed straightaway at the level of the Supreme Court or the High Court, the parties do not have a meaningful opportunity to present evidence on record before the start of the court proceeding. To overcome this problem, our Courts have developed the practice of appointing ‘fact-finding commissions’ on a caseby-case basis which are deputed to inquire into the subject-matter of the case and report back to the Court. These commissions usually consist of experts
in the concerned fields or practicing lawyers. In matters involving complex legal considerations, the Courts also seek the services of senior counsels by appointing them as amicus curiae on a case-by-case basis.
6
Considering the objections to the doctrine of ‘judicial review’ However, in many jurisdictions - questions have been asked about the proper understanding of ‘judicial review’ as well as its expansion. There are
two principled objections offered against the very idea of ‘judicial review’ in a democratic order.
The first idea is that the judiciary being an unelected body is not accountable to the people through any  institutional mechanism. In most countries judges are appointed through methods involving selection or
nomination, in which ordinary citizens do not have a say. It is argued that allowing the judiciary to rule on the validity of the enactments passed by a popularly elected legislature amounts to a violation of the idea of ‘separation of powers’. Skepticism is also voiced  against judges using their personal discretion to grant remedies in areas in which they have no expertise. This critique locates the role of the judiciary as purely one of resolving disputes between parties and deferring to the prescriptions of the elected legislature
while doing so. In the Common Law realm, this critique is based on the ageold notion of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’. With respect to the inherent value of a written constitution that also incorporates ‘judicial review’, it would be appropriate to refer to an observation made by Justice Aharon Barak:
“To maintain real democracy and to ensure a delicate balance between its elements -a formal constitution is  preferable. To operate effectively, a constitution should enjoy normative supremacy, should not be as easily
amendable as a normal statute, and should give judges the power to review the constitutionality of legislation. Without a formal constitution, there is no legal limitation on legislative supremacy, and the supremacy of human rights can exist only by the grace of the majority’s self-restraint. A constitution, however, imposes legal  limitations on the legislature and guarantees that human rights are protected not only by the self-restraint of
the majority, but also by constitutional control over the majority. Hence, the need for a formal constitution.”

However, we must also consider another nuanced objection to the doctrine of ‘judicial review’. It is reasoned that the substantive contents of a constitution adopted by a country at a particular point of time reflect the will
of its framers. However, it is not necessary that the intent of the framers corresponds to the will of the majority of the population at any given time.

In the Indian setting, it is often argued that the members of the Constituent Assembly were overwhelmingly drawn from elite backgrounds and hence did not represent popular opinions on several vital issues. Furthermore, the adoption of a constitution entails a country’s precommitment to its contents
and the same become binding on future generations.

Clearly the understanding and application of constitutional principles cannot remain static and hence a constitutional text  also lays down a procedure for its amendment.

This power of amendment by the legislature is not unlimited and the idea of ‘judicial review’ designates the higher judiciary as the protector of the constitution. This scheme works smoothly as long as the demands and
aspirations of the majority of the population correspond with the constitutional prescriptions. However, scope for dissonance arises when majoritarian policy-choices embodied in legislative or executive acts come
into conflict with constitutional provisions. The higher judiciary is then required to scrutinize the actions of  its co-equal branches of government.

Some scholars have argued that fact-situations of this type involve tensions between the understanding of the words ‘constitutionalism’ and ‘democracy’ respectively. Hence, it is postulated that the provision for ‘judicial review’ gives a self-contradictory twist  to the expression ‘constitutional democracy’.

In this regard the role of the judiciary can be described as one of protecting the countermajoritarian safeguards enumerated in the Constitution. It is apt to refer to an opinion given by Justice Robert Jackson
where it was held that citizens could  not be compelled to salute the U.S. national flag if the same offended their religious beliefs.

He observed as follows:
‘The very purpose of the bill of rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the Courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote: they depend on the outcome of no elections.’
For example, in India there is considerable disenchantment with the constitutional provision which places the personal laws of religious groups beyond the scope of constitutional scrutiny. The framers preferred this
position in order to protect the usages and customs of religious minorities with regard to the guarantee of ‘freedom of religion’. However, there have been persistent majoritarian demands for a constitutional amendment of this position in order to enact a ‘Uniform Civil Code’ for regulating the private relations of citizens belonging to all religions. Even though there may be a good case for some specific changes to personal laws with the objective of ensuring gender-justice, the demands  for the whole-scale rejection of
personal laws threaten a majoritarian imposition. Noted scholar Samuel Isacharoff has argued that in fractured or pluralist societies it is beneficial to implement a constitutional scheme in order to restrain destructive
majoritarian tendencies.

 
How have Indian courts expanded the meaning of rights?
It can be stated with some certainty that the doctrine of ‘judicial review’ helps in binding a polity to its core constitutional principles. In the post World War II era, the memory of devastating conflicts and oppressive
colonialism ensured that these principles were initially centered on the protection of basic civil-political  rights such as free speech, assembly, association and movement as well as guarantees against abusive practices by
state agencies such as arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and extra-judicial killings. The growth of Constitutionalism has also been synonymous with that of liberal values which seek to safeguard an individual’s dignity as well  as collective welfare at the same time. In highly disparate and iniquitous societies, such a commitment also requires some countermajoritarian safeguards. Depending on the social profile of a country’s population, these safeguards may be in the nature of exceptional treatment for ethnic, religious and cultural minorities as well as proactive measures designed for the advancement of historically disadvantaged communities and poorer sections of society. Such safeguards which are  meant to tackle social differences
based on factors such as religion,  caste, gender, class and region among others, also have clear socio-economic  dimensions. Hence, the role of the Courts in protecting constitutional values goes beyond the enforcement of clearly defined civil-political rights that can be litigated by individual citizens and incorporates a continuously evolving understanding of ‘group rights’ which necessarily have socio-economic dimensions as well.

To appreciate the transformation in the substantive nature of justiciable rights, it is necessary to reiterate the theoretical distinction between their ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ dimensions.

The classification of enumerated rights can be based on who they are  directed against and whether they
involve a ‘duty of restraint’ or a  ‘duty to facilitate entitlements’. The language of a substantive right usually indicates whether it is directed against state agencies, private actors  or both. For instance in the Indian
Constitution, civil-political rights such as ‘freedom of speech, assembly and association’ are directed against the State, since the text expressly refers to the State’s power to impose reasonable  restrictions on the exercise of the same. This implies that under ordinary conditions the State has an obligation not to infringe on these liberties. This ‘duty of restraint’ forms the basis of rights with a ‘negative’ dimension. Hence in the early years of the Indian constitutional experience, civil liberties and the protection against deprivation of life and liberty were understood mainly as imposing duties of restraint on governmental agencies as well as private citizens. However, in contrast to these justiciable ‘negative’ rights the directive principles of state policy allude to several socio-economic objectives which had a ‘positive’ dimension. Even though the directive principles are non-justiciable, there language is couched in  the terms of positive obligations on governmental
agencies to enable their fulfillment.

The Indian Courts have responded to this hierarchy between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ rights by trying to collapse the distinction between the same. While the fundamental rights of citizens enumerated in Part III of the Constitution are justiciable before the higher judiciary, Part IV deals with the ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’ that largely enumerate objectives pertaining to socio-economic entitlements.

The Directive Principles aim at creating an egalitarian society whose citizens are free from the abject
physical conditions that had hitherto  prevented them from fulfilling their best selves. They are the creative part of the Constitution, and fundamental to the governance of the  country. However, the key feature is that the
Directive Principles are ‘non-justiciable’ but are yet supposed to be the basis of executive and legislative actions. It is interesting to note that at the time of  drafting of the Constitution, some of the provisions which are presently part of the Directive Principles were part of the declaration of fundamental rights
adopted by the Congress party. K.M. Munshi (a noted lawyer and a member of the Constituent Assembly) had even included in his draft list of rights, the ‘rights of workers’ and ‘social rights’, which included provisions protecting women and children and guaranteeing the right to work, a decent wage, and
a decent standard of living.

 Subsequently, the objective of ensuring these entitlements was included in the Directive Principles.
The primordial importance of these principles can be understood by the following words of Dr. B.R Ambedkar, when he insisted on the use of the word ‘strive’ in the language of Article 38 which mentions the governmental objective of an equitable distribution of material resources:
“We have used it because it is our intention that even when there are circumstances which prevent the Government, or which stand in the way of the Government giving effect to these  directive principles, they shall, even under hard and unpropitious circumstances, always strive in the fulfillment of these directives. … Otherwise it would be open for any Government to say that the circumstances are so bad, that the finances are so inadequate that we cannot even make an effort in the direction in which the Constitution asks
us to go.” [Constituent Assembly Debates, 19-11-1948]

Thus, the enforceability of measures relating to social equality though incorporated in aspirational terms was never envisaged as being dependent only on the availability of state resources. In some instances, the Courts have  privileged fundamental rights over directive principles while in others they have creatively drawn a harmonious  relationship between the two. An example of this is the expansion of the conception of ‘personal liberty’ under Article 21 of the Constitution which was traditionally invoked in the civilpolitical context to check governmental abuses. The judicially expanded understanding of the same now  includes several socio-economic entitlements for citizens which place positive obligations on the state. What is interesting is that the reading in of these socio-economic entitlements by judges has often directly referred to the language of provisions contained in the part dealing with directive principles. In this sense, judicial creativity has
transformed the substantive character of the protection of life and liberty.    

Article 21 of the Constitution of India reads as follows: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” The interpretation of this article in the early years of the Supreme Court was that ‘personal liberty’ could be curtailed as long as there was a legal prescription for the same. In A.K. Gopalan’s case, the Supreme Court had ruled that ‘preventive detention’ by state agencies was permissible as long as it was provided for under a governmental measure (e.g. legislation
or an ordinance) and the Court could not inquire into the fairness of such a measure. It was held that the words ‘procedure established by law’ were different from the ‘substantive due  process’ guarantee provided under the 14th amendment to the US Constitution. It was also reasoned that the framers of the Indian Constitution consciously preferred the former expression over the latter. This narrow construction of Article 21 prevailed for several years  until it was changed in Maneka Gandhi’s case.

 In that decision, it was held that governmental restraints on ‘personal liberty’ should be collectively
tested against the guarantees of fairness, non-arbitrariness and reasonableness that were prescribed under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court developed a theory of ‘inter-relationship of rights’
to hold that governmental action which curtailed either of these rights should meet the designated threshold for restraints on all of them. In this manner, the Courts incorporated the guarantee of ‘substantive due process’ into the language of Article 21.

 This was followed by a series of decisions, where the conceptions of ‘life’ and ‘personal liberty’ were interpreted liberally to include rights which had not been expressly enumerated in Part III. In the
words of Justice Bhagwati:
“we think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with  it, namely the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head and facilities
for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms.”

Notably, over the decades, the Supreme Court has affirmed that both the Fundamental Rights and Directive  Principles must be interpreted harmoniously. It was observed in the Kesavananda Bharati case, that the
directive principles and the fundamental rights supplement each other and aim at the same goal of bringing  about a social revolution and the establishment of a welfare State, the objectives which are also enumerated in

, Justice Jeevan Reddy declared:
“The provisions of Parts III and IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and not  exclusionary of each other and that the fundamental rights are but a means to achieve the goal indicated in Part
IV”.
This approach of harmonizing the fundamental rights and directive principles has been successful to a considerable extent. As indicated earlier, the Supreme Court has interpreted the ‘protection of life and personal liberty’ as one which contemplates socio-economic entitlements.  For instance, in  Olga Tellis v.  Bombay Municipal Corporation,  a journalist had filed a petition on behalf of hundreds of pavement-dwellers who were being displaced due to construction activity by the respondent corporation.

The Court recognised the ‘right to livelihood and housing’ of the pavementdwellers and issued an injunction to halt their eviction.  In Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, the Court held that no medical authority could refuse to provide immediate medical attention to a patient in need in an emergency caseThe public interest litigation had arisen because many hospitals were refusing to admit patients in medico-legal cases. Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that access to healthcare, is a justiciable right.  In another prominent Public Interest Litigation, the Supreme Court ordered the relocation of hazardous industries located near residential areas in New Delhi. In the process, it spelt out the citizens’ ‘right to clean environment’                                              

The court has also recognized access to free education as a justiciable right.
 This decision prompted a Constitutional amendment which inserted Article 21-A into the Constitutional text, thereby guaranteeing the right to elementary education for children aged between 6-14 years. The Courts have also pointed to Directive principles in interpreting the  prohibitions against forced labour and child labour. The enforcement of these rights leaves a lot to be desired, but the symbolic value of their constitutional status should not be underestimated.

Milestones of Public Interest Litigation in India 
One of the earliest cases of public interest litigation was reported as Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. State of Bihar.



This case was concerned with a series of articles published in a prominent newspaper - the Indian Express
which exposed the plight of undertrial prisoners in the state of Bihar. A writ petition was filed by an advocate drawing the Court’s attention to the deplorable plight of these prisoners.  Many of them had been in jail for
longer periods than the maximum permissible sentences for the offences they had been charged with. The Supreme Court accepted the locus standi of the advocate to maintain the writ petition. Thereafter, a series of cases followed in which the Court gave directions through which the ‘right to speedy trial’ was deemed to be an integral and an essential part of the protection of life and personal liberty.
Soon thereafter, two noted professors of law filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court highlighting various abuses of the law, which, they asserted, were a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.

These included inhuman conditions prevailing in protective homes, long pendency of trials in court,
trafficking of women, importation of children for homosexual purposes, and the non-payment of wages to bonded labourers among others. The Supreme Court accepted their  locus standi to represent the suffering masses and passed guidelines and orders that greatly ameliorated the conditions of these people.
In another matter, a journalist, Ms. Sheela Barse, took up the plight of women prisoners who were confined in the police jails in the city of Bombay. She asserted that they were victims of custodial violence. The
Court took cognizance of the matter and directions were issued to the Director of College of Social Work, Bombay. He was ordered to visit the Bombay Central Jail and conduct interviews of various women prisoners in order to ascertain whether they had been subjected to torture or ill-treatment.

He was asked to submit a report to the Court in this regard. Based on his findings, the Court issued directions  such as the detention of female prisoners only in designated female lock-ups guarded by female constables
and that accused females could be interrogated only in the presence of a female police official.

It was initiated by a letter that was written by a prisoner lodged in jail to a Judge of the Supreme Court. The prisoner complained of a brutal assault committed by a Head Warder on another prisoner. The Court treated that letter as a writ petition, and, while issuing various directions, opined that: 


“…technicalities and legal niceties  are no impediment to the court entertaining even an informal communication as a proceeding for habeas corpus if the basic facts are found”.

UPTET : After assurance of CM, Candidates fear gone


आश्वासन से बेफिक्र अभ्यर्थी
(UPTET : After assurance of CM, Candidates fear gone)


हरदोई। टीईटी उत्तीर्ण संघर्ष मोर्चा के बैनर तले हुई सफल अभ्यर्थियों की बैठक में वक्ताओं ने गुरुवार के दिन को उन सब के लिए काफी शुभ बताते हुए कहा कि अब घबराने की कोई बात नहीं है। मुख्यमंत्री ने तीन सप्ताह के भीतर नियुक्ति प्रक्रि या पूर्व निर्धारित विज्ञप्ति के अनुसार कोर्ट के फैसले के बाद शुरू करने का आश्वासन दिया है। 
शहीद उद्यान में टीईटी सफल अभ्यर्थियों को संबोधित करते हुए संघर्ष मोर्चा जिलाध्यक्ष अवनीश यादव ने यह बात कही। उन्होंने कहा कि मुख्यमंत्री से मिले प्रतिनिधि मंडल के सदस्यों ने अपना तार्किक पक्ष उनके सामने रखा। जिस पर मुख्यमंत्री अखिलेश यादव ने युवाओं के भविष्य और रोजगार को ध्यान में रखकर आश्वासन दिया है। मीडिया प्रभारी देवेश सिंह गौर ने बताया कि संघर्ष मोर्चा प्रतिनिधि मंडल की मुख्यमंत्री से हुई वार्ता सफल रही। उन्होंने नियुक्ति होने तक सभी को संगठित रहने को कहा है। उन्होंने कहा कि अब चयन का आधार पूर्व की भांति टीईटी मेरिट को ही बनाया जाएगा। इस मौके पर हिमांशु पांडे, अतुल शुक्ला, सौरभ त्रिपाठी, आशुतोष शुक्ला, सूरज तिवारी, ह्देश श्रीवास्तव आदि मौजूद थे। उधर, शिखा पाल ने कहा कि कहने की बात नहीं कि इन नियुक्तियों के साथ अभ्यर्थियों ने अपने भविष्य को जोड़ दिया है। यदि इसके बाद भी नियुक्ति के पूर्व मानकों से खिलवाड़ हुआ तो युवाओं को इस सरकार से भी विश्वास उठ जाएगा। ज्योति गुप्ता ने कहा कि तत्कालीन सरकार ने नियुक्ति का जो आधार बताया उस पर बेरोजगारों ने जान लड़ा दी और परीक्षा को उत्तीर्ण किया।
उन्होंने कहा कि यदि यह सरकार अपना नियम बनाएगी और पिछले को खत्म कर देगी तो न्याय नहीं करेगी। जिलाध्यक्ष अवनीश यादव ने कहा कि अब टीईटी अभ्यर्थियों को पूर्ण उम्मीद हो चली है कि मुख्यमंत्री अधिकारों का हनन नहीं करेंगे और टीईटी सफल अभ्यर्थियों को न्याय दिलाएंगे

News : Amar Ujala (7.4.12)